Daniel Kimmage of RFE/RL has an outstanding analysis of the recent political murder in Kazakhstan and the shadowy politics that surround it. Don’t miss it; it is worth a read in its entirety.

It draws heavily upon a November 2005 report by the Eurasian Center for Political Research and the Epicenter Agency for Social Technologies (if anyone has a link to the full text, please comment) to describe the various power groups that vie for influence over President Nazarbayev, and analyzes who the winners and losers are from Sarsenbaev’s murder. The series of connections is so convoluted and murky that it will take a careful read just to understand how Sarsenbaev’s death hurt the power group that surrounds Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Timur Kulibaev, formerly thought to be the most influential, and advanced the standing of the president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva and her husband Rakhat Aliev.

Here is the connection:

The fallout from the murder investigation has already had an impact on one of the influence groups identified above, namely that of presidential son-in-law Timur Kulibaev. As an article in Respublika on February 24 noted, the removal of KNB head Nartai Dutbaev and the arrest of Utembaev are “two blows” against Senate speaker Nartai Abykaev, since Dutbaev was Abykaev’s ally, and Utembaev his subordinate. Abykaev, whose post technically puts him next in the chain of command should the president be incapacitated, is a former head of the National Security Committee (KNB) and reportedly an ally of Kulibaev.

So not only did Dariga’s faction gain from the murder (a loss for Kuliaev’s powerbase is a gain for hers), she has a history of personal enmity with Sarsenbaev, as Ben points out. Naturally, she is not to pleased with these allegations, and has decried the murder as an attempt to discredit her father.

The RFE/RL report indicates that while the trail to the person ultimately responsible for Sarsenbaev’s death most certainly does not end with Utembaev (as authorities insist), it also does not likely end at the top with Nazarbayev. Rather, it instead represents the first of what will be a continuing, openly violent struggle between influence groups to achieve prominence and be at the forefront of succession politics.

Kimmage also raises some important questions about Kazakhstan’s stability. Because its system of “managed” democracy has power groups answerable to the president instead of the people, a system of “shadow” politics emerges as rival powerbases, often based on kinship ties. This leads not only to instability in its own right, but the byproduct of shadow politics (grisly murder and intrigue) lends momentum to popular dissatisfaction with the current regime, as evidenced by the recent rallies in Kazakhstan.

According to Kimmage’s analysis, Sarsenbaev’s murder marks the beginning, not the end, of a system of shadow politics and the consequent political violence.