New Government
This is a translation of Adam Kesher’s post, published on Russian-language neweurasia Kazakhstan. All links are in the original post
Most ministers have kept their portfolio in the new government.
Despite the series of scandals with improper distribution of finances, described in details by the journalists of “Vremya” newspaper, Balieva has kept her Minister of Justice position. Both Minister of Labor Karagusova, who was criticized for her lack of competence on numerous occasions, and Minister of Agriculture Esimov, who did not have any achievements in his sector, have also remained in place. All three are among the most loyal to the president officials.
Mukhamedzhanov has remained the Minister of Internal Affairs. His name – in accusing tones – has been mentioned many times last year during the trial in the case of murder of the opposition leader Sarsenbayev, mainly, in connection with violations in the course of investigation. It is assumed that he belongs to R. Aliev’s group. Yertysbaev has stayed a Minister of Information, who, on the other hand, was notable for a series of confrontations with the clan of Aliev-Nazarbayeva.
It is thought that Premier Masimov is supported by T. Kulibaev’s clan. It is interesting that when the president was introducing Masimov to the Parliament, he did not mention his ethnicity, got away from the text and started his musings about multiculturalism in Kazakhstan. Because ethnic tolerance is often used as regime’s “brand”, it is unclear why did they fail to mention that the new premier is not Kazakh. The government has once been led by a non-Kazakh Tereshenko back in the 1990s.
The deputy Prime Minister with the position of the Minister of Economy is Mussin. His ability to manage the economy has been often questioned by the observers, but the position of Vice is a key position for a PM (in the USSR, it was deemed that the 2nd secretaries of republic’s Communist parties were managing the 1st). In this regard Mussin is openly loyal to the president and he is notable for saying that the main criteria for the selection of the officials should be their faithfulness to the head of the state.
The fate of two other “unsinkable” figures of Kazakh bureaucratic chess has turned in an unexpected and hard-to-explain way – Khrapunov, who has caused many problems when he has been a mayor of Almaty – from questionable land and construction operations to leasing the important objects of public property, became a Minister of Emergency Situations. Ex-Premier Akhmetov, who has never served in the army, became a Minister of Defense. Former head of defense department Altynbaev has been appointed as his deputy and the head of general headquarters.
Tazhin has changed the chair of the Secretary of the Security Council to the chair of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, though he is not enough a public person for such a position, and is more in favor of “shadow” methods. He is known as Aliev’s opponent in the internal fights. He is new to the diplomatic service. Tuimebaev, the cadre diplomat, has been called from the embassy position in Moscow to manage the education and science in Kazakhstan. Orazbakov has returned to public service into the Ministry of Industry, who, for the last four years, has been working at the defense holding company “Kazakhstan Engeneering”.
Abykaev, whose name was mentioned many times in connection with Sarsenbayev’s murder (his close assistant Utembayev was said to order a murder), long time faithful associate of Nazarbayev, has been freed from the position of the speaker of Senate and – ironically – sent as an ambassador to Russia, where, in 2002-2003 the diplomatic mission has been led by slain Sarsenbayev. Sending such a persona to the capital of the most important political partner of Kazakhstan could be regarded with suspicion in Moscow.
The ex-Minister of Foreign Affaird Tokaev has become the second person in the state – the head of the Senate of the Parliament. Tokaev, it is assumed, is close to the Aliev’s group. It is hardly a favorable outcome for himself, who seriously considers the position of the General Secretary of the UN, taking into account the artificial functionally of the Senate (one third of its members is appointed by the president, the rest are elected by “maslikhats” of the regions, who are being suppressed by the governors), i.e. real power functions at this position are close to zero.
Even though the Constitution provides that the head of the Senate takes over the duties of the head of the state in case the president is unable to do so, this can hardly be discussed in the nearest future. Tokaev was quite a weak manager during his premiership and at the time of the crisis of autumn 2001 he looked somewhat lost and dependent.
In general, the balance of interests between the three strongest clans (Kulibaev, Aliev and other, personally faithful) in the Government is provided, which should indicate that the president still has a firm grip on the situation. It is worth noting that Berik Imashev has been appointed a head of the Security Council (the day before Kanat Sudabaev, current ambassador to the United States was “almost” appointed). This moderate liberal has supported the “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan” in 2001 and has been put aside following a formal demand by Tokaev.
He is considered to be equally neutral to different clans, though his daughter is married to the son of Aliev and Nazarbayeva and she has, despite a young age (21 years) her own television and radio company.














